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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
All the parties to the proceedings below are listed in the caption. However, the only
parties participating in this appeal are the plaintififs Judy Snell and LeRoy Snell, guardians
and conservators of the estate of Kenneth Reed Snell and the defendant Draper City. The
remaining defendants have been dismissed without prejudice from the proceedings.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(3)(j) (1996).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Draper did not owe a duty to Snell to
maintain traffic control devices in a safe condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic where
the imdisputed facts demonstrate that Draper had posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign
on the west side of the Frontage Road to control southbound traffic but failed to post any
speed limit signs or other traffic control devices on the east side of the road to similarly
control northbound traffic, thereby creating an inherently dangerous and defective traffic
control condition which Snell alleges was a proximate cause of the accident.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because summary judgment only involves issues of law, this Court should review the
trial court's conclusions for correctness. County Oaks Condominium Management v. Jones,
851 P.2d 640 (Utah 1993); St. Benedicts Development v. St. Benedicts Hospital 811 P.2d
194, 196 (Utah 1991). Additionally, "[o]n an appeal from summary judgment, we consider
only two questions: whether the lower court erred in (1) applying the governing law and (2)
holding that no material facts were in dispute." Nelson by and through Stuckman v. Salt
Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). "Furthermore, because
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly

done by juries rather than judges summary judgment is appropriate in negligence case only
in the clearest instances" Id. (quoting Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah
1991)).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, § 63-30-4(l)(b),
63-30-8 and 63-30-10 (1993). Referenced sections are included at Tab 1 of the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 13, 1993, Kenneth Reed Snell was seriously and permanently injured in
an automobile and truck collision on a road under Draper City's control. The collision
occurred on the east Frontage Road that parallels Interstate 15, at Point of the Mountain,
Utah. Draper City had posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign regulating the flow of
southbound traffic on thefrontageroad but had failed to post any speed limit signs similarly
regulating the flow of northbound traffic on said road. The trial court granted Draper City's
motion for summary judgment and ruled that Draper owed no duty to Kenneth Reed Snell
to post similar traffic control devices for northbound traffic. This appeal is takenfromthe
trial court's Order Granting City of Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically,
the trial court concluded that: (1) Draper had no duty to regulate northbound traffic
notwithstanding that Draper had imdertaken to regulate southboimd traffic; and (2) that the
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public duty doctrine barred Snell's claims. [Order Granting City of Draper's Motion for
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order") at 3-5, a copy of which is attached hereto at Tab
2 of the Appendix.]
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The trial court found the following facts to be undisputed and material to its
determination of the duty issue.
1.

Plaintiffs are the guardians and conservators of the estate of Kenneth Read

Snell, who was seriously injured in an automobile collision in Draper, Utah, on October 13,
1993. [Order at 2.]
2.

The collision occurred on the eastfrontageroad that parallels Interstate 15,

where it intersects with a private road leading to a sand and gravel facility. [Order at 2.]
3.

Mr. Snell was returning from the Lehi Animal Shelter, where he had picked

up a load of animals to return to the University of Utah, where he was employed. [Order at
2.]
4.

Mr. Snell was traveling northbound on thefrontageroad when the University

of Utah van he was driving collided with a southbound large truck used to haul sand and
gravel owned by Cazier Excavation. Darrell Casey, the driver of the Cazier truck, was

proceeding southbound and turning left across the northbound lane onto the private dirt road
which was owned and maintained by Geneva Rock. [Order at 2.]
5.

Draper City was responsible for the maintenance of the frontage road in

question but not of the private road which intersected with it. [Order at 2.]
6.

The place of the accident was approximately one mile north of the south Draper

City boundary. [Order at 2.]
7.

Prior to the accident, Draper had posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign

on the west side of thefrontageroad which regulated the speed of southbound traffic that
governed the operation of the Cazier truck. Draper City had not placed any speed limit signs,
or signs warning of the intersection on the east side of the frontage road regulating the
operation of the Snell vehicle. [Order at 3.]
There is evidence that Kenneth Reed Snell will require 24-hour-per-day care and
supervision for the balance of his natural life as a result of the injuries he suffered in this
accident. There is also evidence that if Draper had regulated northbound traffic in a similar
fashion to its regulation of the southbound traffic (40 miles per hour), and if Snell's vehicle
had been traveling at 40 miles per hour, the accident would not have occurred, (R. 12) that
Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant City of Draper's First Set of Interrogatories, Response

to Interrogatory No. 27. In light of the trial court's ruling on the duty issue, it did not reach
these facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in holding that Draper did not owe Snell a duty of reasonable care
because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Draper affirmatively undertook to control the
flow of traffic on the east frontage road where the collision occurred. Plaintiffs allege that
Draper was negligent in the manner it chose to control such traffic. Utah courts and the
majority of other jurisdictions have long recognized that municipalities have a nondelegable
duty to exercise reasonable care in their regulation and maintenance of streets within the
municipalities' control.
Notwithstanding this well-established precedence, the trial court held that Draper
owed Snell no duty because: (1) Draper's regulation of southbound traffic did not impose
a duty on Draper to regulate northbound traffic in a similar fashion; and (2) the public duty
doctrine barred SnelFs claim. Order at 3-5. More specifically, the trial court held that
Draper's duty was a duty to all and that a duty to all is a duty to none absent a showing of a
special relationship, which individual relationship the court found to be lacking. Id
The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied Utah precedent. Accordingly, Section
I of this Argument explains why Draper owed Snell a duty once it undertook to control the
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safe flow of traffic on thefrontageroad. It further explains how the public duty doctrine may
be reconciled with the courts' pronouncements holding that municipalities owe a duty of
reasonable care in their regulation and maintenance of streets under their control.
Alternatively, Section II argues that the public duty doctrine should be abrogated in total or
at least in dangerous road condition cases in light of legislative mandates.
ARGUMENT
I.
Draper Owed Snell a Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care Because Draper
Affirmatively Undertook to Regulate and Control the Flow of Traffic When It
Installed a 40 Mile An Hour Speed Limit Sign Governing Southbound Traffic.
Utah has developed well-established precedent holding that governmental entities
have a nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care in their regulation and maintenance of
streets and roadways within their control. See, e.g., Keegan v. State. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah
1995); Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp.. 860 P.2d 336 (Utah 1993); Duncan v. Union
Pacific R. Co.. 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992); Trapp v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 835 P.2d 161 (Utah
1992); Jerz v. Salt Lake County. 822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991); Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733
P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) Richards v. Leavitt 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985); Bowen v. Riverton
Citv. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Bigelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Murray v.
Ogden Citv. 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976); Carroll v. State Road Common. 496 P.2d 888;
Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970); Velasquez v. Union Pacific R. Co..
6

469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970); Bramel v. State Road ComnTn. 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970); Nyman
v.Cedar Citv. 361 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1961); Rollow v. Ogden Citv. 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791
(1926); Pollari v. Salt Lake Citv. 176 P.2d 111 (Utah 1947); Berger v. Salt Lake City. 56
Utah 403, 191 P. 233 (1920); Shugren v. Salt Lake City. 48 Utah 320, 159 P. 530 (1916);
Sweet v. Salt Lake Citv. 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913); Robinson v. Salt Lake City. 40
Utah 497, 121 P. 968 (1912); Bills v. Salt Lake Citv. 37 Utah 507,109 P. 745 (1910); Morris
v. Salt Lake Citv. 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373 (1909); Jones v. Ogden City. 32 Utah 221, 89 P.
1006 (1907); Scott v. Provo City. 14 Utah 31,45 P. 1005 (1895); De Villiers v. Utah County.
882 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994); Jones v. Bountiful Citv Corp.. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App.
1992); Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990)
For example, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a city has a nondelegable duty to
maintain its traffic control devices in a condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic.
Richards. 716 P.2d at 277-79. The court held that a claim against a city for negligent
maintenance of a stop sign is subject to the notice of claim requirements in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. JJL at 277-79. The court expressly adopted 18 Eugene
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53.42 (3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter
"McQuillin"), as a valid statement of the city's duty. Id. at 278-79. The court reasoned that
"the rule is that once having elected to erect devices to guide, direct or illuminate traffic
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where no duty exists to do so, a municipality then has a duty to maintain those devices in a
condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic and will be liable for its negligence in failing
to do so." IdL at 278 (quoting 18 McQuillin § 53.42).
Further, in Bowen v. Riverton City, the court held that Riverton had a nondelegable
duty to maintain its traffic control devices making summary judgment inappropriate where
the city knew a stop sign was laying down for approximately eighteen minutes before an
accident occurred at an intersection regulated by that stop sign. BoweiL 656 P.2d at 435-37.
The court stated Utah's oft pronounced rule that:
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise due care in
maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries in a
reasonably safe condition for travel and the city may be held
liable for injuries proximately resulting from its failure to do so.
In fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities to maintain traffic
control signals in a reasonably safe, visible, and working
condition. Whether the city fulfilled its duty to maintain the city
streets in a safe condition in the instant case is a question of fact
to be determined by the jury.
Id at 437 (citations omitted).
The legislature has also implicitly recognized that governmental entities owe a duty
of reasonable care in regulating and maintaining the safe flow of traffic. Specifically, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 provides that "immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
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highway, road, [or] street" (Of course this waiver of immunity is qualified by the exception
for discretionary or policy acts; see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.) Any waiver of immunity
by the legislature would be rendered meaningless if governmental entities did not owe a duty
in thefirstplace. That governmental entities owe a duty of reasonable care in regulating and
maintaining the safe flow of traffic seems obvious.
Indeed, as was recognized by this Court in Jones v. Bountiful City, "decisions in a
majority of the states affirm implied liability to private action for injuries resulting from
defective public ways." Bountiful City. 834 P.2d at 560 (quoting 19 McQuillin § 54.02 (3d
ed. 1985)). In Bountiful City, this Court held that Bountiful did not have a duty to install
traffic control devices to regulate an unsigned intersection and that it did not have a duty to
remove foliage on private property. Id. This Court reasoned that while a municipality is not
generally affirmatively required to erect traffic control devices, "once the municipality takes
action to install such devices, it must do so in a non-negligent manner." Id. (citing 19
McQuillin § 54.28b (3d ed. 1985)Xemphasis added). McQuillin explains that "though a city
is not generally liable for failure to install signs or signals, if it undertakes to do so and
invites public reliance on such signs or signals, it may be held liable for creating a dangerous
condition, or nuisance." 19 McQuillin § 54.28.10 (3d ed. 1994).

Notwithstanding this well-established precedent, the trial court held that Draper did
not owe Snell a duty because any duty Draper had was a duty to the public at large and not
to Snell as an individual. [Order at 4-5; (R. 19-20).] The court relied expressly on the public
duty doctrine in holding that SnelTs claims were barred. Order at 4-5. Unfortunately, the
trial court misconstrued and misapplied the so-called public duty doctrine.
At the core of the public duty doctrine is the notion that the law will only impose
affirmative duties to act when a special relationship exists and absent a special relationship
there is no duty. See, e.g., Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) (failure to control
mental health patient); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989); Beach v. University of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (failure to control student); Pease v. Industrial Common, 694
P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) (failure to aiTest allegedly drunken motorist); Obray v. Malmberg, 484
P.2d 160 (Utah 1971) (failure to investigate burglary); Cannon v. University of Utah, 866
P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to affirmatively assist pedestrians); Lamarr v. Utah Dep't
of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992) (failure to construct additional walkways or
control transients).
In Beach the court held that the University of Utah had no duty to control a student
on a field trip who wandered off from camp unnoticed and apparently fell off a cliff while
intoxicated.

Beach, 726 P.2d at 414-17.

The court reasoned that only in "unusual
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circumstances" would the court impose an "affirmative duty to care for another." IdL at 415.
Further, the court stated that:
The law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only
when certain special relationships exist between the parties.
These relationships generally arise when one assumes
responsibilities for another's safety or deprives another of his or
her normal opportunities for self-protection.
Id (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1964)). The court found that no "special
relationship" existed. Beach. 726 P.2d at 416-17.
Likewise, in Ferree the court held that the State had no duty to affirmatively prevent
a previously nonviolent inmatefromkilling a private citizen while the inmate was released
into the temporary custody of his mother to attend a wedding. Ferree, 784 P.2d at 150-52.
The court reasoned that "[d]uty is 'a question of whether the defendant is under any
obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff.'" Id at 151 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 53 (W. Page Keeton, 5th ed. 1984). The court contrasted this situation
with situations where a governmental entity had assumed a specific duty of care or where the
governmental entity had reason to appreciate that an inmate had demonstrated a capacity for
violence. Ferree, 784 P.2d at 150-52. In finding that the State owed no duty of care, the
court expressly reasoned that the State had no reason to know that the inmate was violent.
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Finally, in Rollins, the court held that Utah State Hospital had no affirmative duty to
prevent an AWOL mental health patient from subsequently stealing a vehicle and colliding
with a private citizen. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1158-62. The court stated "[w]e acknowledge
the general application in Utah of the 'special relation' analysis described in sections 314
through 320 of the Restatement of Torts." Id, at 1159 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§§314-20 (1965)). The court, after reviewing its previous decisions, employed a "pragmatic
approach." Id. at 1160-62. The court reasoned that "[d]etennining whether one party has
an affirmative duty to protect another... requires a careful consideration of the consequences
for the parties and society at large." 14. at 1160 (quoting Beach, 726 P.2d at 418).
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a special relationship
distinguishable to the hospital that would justify imposing on the hospital an affirmative duty
to protect the plaintiff. Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162.
Here, the trial court erred in using the public duty doctrine as a shield to Draper's
negligent regulation of traffic on the frontage road where Draper affirmatively acted in
erecting a speed limit sign for only one direction of traffic on the same road. The public duty
doctrine governs situations where the question is whether or not to impose an affirmative
duty to act (or protect! for the benefit of a particular plaintiff. It does not govern situations
where the governmental entity has affirmatively undertaken the duty.
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To be certain, there is language in the various court pronouncements on the public
duty doctrine that would lend credence to Justice Durham's comment that "a duty to all is
a duty to none." Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1165 (Durham, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part; arguing for the abrogation of the public duty doctrine). But any such characterization
of the public duty doctrine fails to appreciate the context in which these statements were
made and, that at its core, the tort principle in question is whether to impose an affirmative
duty to act. As has been acknowledged by legal commentators, there is a fundamental
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.
For example, in W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts § 56
(5th ed. 1984), the authors explain:
Liability for nonfeasance was therefore slow to receive
recognition in the law. It first appears in the case of those
engaged in 'public' callings, who, by holding themselves out to
the public, were regarded as having undertaken a duty to give
service, for the breach of which they were liable. With the
development of the action of assumpsit, this principle was
extended to anyone who, for a consideration, has undertaken to
perform a promise— or what we now call a contract. During the
last century, liability for 'nonfeasance' has been extended still
further to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public
sentiment and views of social policy have led the courts to find
a duty of affirmative action. In such relationships the plaintiff
is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds
considerable power over the plaintiff's welfare... Liability for
'misfeasance.' then, may extend to any person to whom harm
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may reasonably be anticipated as a result of the defendant's
conduct or perhaps even bevond: while for 'nonfeasance' it is
necessary to find some definite relation between the parties, of
such character that social policy justifies the imposition of a
duty to act.
(Emphasis added.)
Further, the commentators of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in explaining why
the general rule is that a person does not have an afikmative duty to act even when that
person's action is necessary for another's aid, state:
a.
The general rule stated in this Section should be read
together with the other sections which follow. Special relations
may exist between the actor and the other, as stated in § 314A,
which impose upon the actor the duty to take affirmative
precautions for the aid or protection of the other. The actor may
have control of a third person, or of land or chattels, and be
under a duty to exercise such control, as stated in §§ 316-20.
The actor's prior conduct, whether tortious or innocent, may
have created a situation of peril to the other, as result of which
the actor is under a duty to act to prevent the harm, as stated in
§§ 321 and 322. The actor may have committed himself to the
performance of an undertaking, gratuitously or under contract,
and so may have assumed a duty of reasonable care for the
protection of the other, or even a third person, as stated in §§
323, 324, 324A.

c.
... The origin of the rule lay in the early common law
distinction between action and inaction, or 'misfeasance' and
'nonfeasance.' In the early law one who injured another by a
positive affirmative act was held liable without any great regard
14

even for his fault.... Hence liability for nonfeasance was slow
to receive any recognition in the law. It appeared first in, and is
still largely confined to, situations in which there was some
special relation between the parties, on the basis of which the
defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid or
protection of the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965).
Thus, once Draper undertook to regulate the flow of traffic on thefrontageroad, the
analysis of its duty shiftedfromnonfeasance to misfeasance. The misfeasance analysis is set
forth in Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under that section, once an entity
undertakes to perform a service, that entity has a duty to do so in a nonnegligent fashion.
This analysis is implicit in all of the Utah decisions dealing with the defective or unsafe
condition in roads and ways. If not, the public duty doctrine would bar all road defect cases
because governmental entities do not construct, regulate, or maintain roads and ways for
individuals, they do it for the public at large and it would be afictionto pretend otherwise.
Notwithstanding the fact that thefrontageroad was regulated by Draper for the public at
large, Draper, once having chosen to so regulate the flow of traffic, owed a duty to regulate
traffic "in a condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic and will be liable for its
negligence in failing to do so." Richards, 716 P.2d at 278 (quoting 18 McQuillin § 53.42);
see also. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d at 559-60.
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This method of analysis found explicit acceptance in the recent Utah Supreme Court
case of Nelson bv and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake Citv. 919 P.2d 568, 572-76 (Utah
1996). In Nelson, the court held that the city (or alternatively, the state) owed a duty of
reasonable care to protect the plaintifffromthe dangers of the Jordan River once it (the city)
decided to erect a fence between a park and the river. LI The court expressly rejected
application of the public duty doctrine because the city had undertaken to provide protection.
Id. The court reasoned:
The common law recognizes a duty of due care on the
part of an individual or entity that undertakes, whether
gratuitously or for consideration, to perform a duty. Breach of
that duty may result in an actionable tort. The Restatement of
Torts describes this duty as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking.
IdL at 573 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1977). The court also reasoned that
"'[w]here one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably
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relies upon the undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable
care/" Nelson, 919 P.2d at 573 (quoting Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 208 (1989) and citing
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah 1983)); see also Weber, bv and
through Weber v. Springville. 725 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Utah 1986).
Thus the court concluded that "once an entity undertakes to provide the protection,
it is obligated to use reasonable care in providing it" Nelson, 919 P.2d at 573. Since the city
had erected a fence, the court found it had assumed the duty to protect the plaintiff in a
nonnegligent fashion. 14 at 572-74. (The court also found that discretionaxy immunity did
not protect the municipality's negligent performance of its duty. LdL at 574-76.)
Similarly, Draper owed Snell a duty to regulate the safe flow of traffic on the frontage
road consistently from both directions of travel once it undertook to regulate southbound
traffic with a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign. Draper argued, and the trial court accepted,
that Draper's regulation of the flow of southbound traffic did not impose a duty upon Draper
to regulate northbound traffic. (R. 4-20); Order at 4. This conclusion is erroneous for
several reasons.
First, as discussed above, it ignores Utah precedent which imposes a duty to regulate
traffic in a condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic, and that breach of that duty will
result in liability; particularly where the regulation contributes to or creates a hazardous
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traffic condition. That Draper undertook this duty should be obvious given that it chose to
regulate southbound traffic.
Second, that conclusion requires the absurd assumption that the southbound lane of
traffic exists independent and isolatedfromthe northbound traffic. Surely the "safe flow of
traffic" encompasses both sides of a two lane highway. Indeed, this is particularly true
where, as here, motorists may lawfully cross the other lane of traffic in entering or exiting
the highway or in passing other vehicles headed the same direction. This is even more true
where the plain impUcation of Draper having posted a 40 mile per hour speed limit sign for
southbound traffic is that Draper was aware of the dangerous conditions on thefrontageroad
created by large trucks traveling upon, entering and exiting thefrontageroad.
Third and finally, this conclusion ignores the fact that Draper's regulation of the
frontage road created an inherently defective, unsafe and dangerous condition. Draper's
affirmative act, by unevenly regulating traffic, created conflicting assumptions for drivers
about the flow of traffic from the opposite direction. As a consequence of Draper's act,
southbound traffic was regulated by the 40 mile per hour speed limit sign, while northbound
traffic was regulated by Utah's default speed limit of 55 miles per hour. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-46(2)(d) (1993). Taking Draper's (and the trial court's) conclusion to its logical end,
Draper would not have a duty if it had posted 20 mile per hour speed limit signs and signs
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warning of slow-moving, entering and exiting traffic so long as Draper had only posted these
signs on the west side of the road governing only southbound traffic, while northbound
traffic is traveling at 55 miles per hour. Under this reasoning, Draper would be found to have
no duty where it posted a school crossing warning and 20 miles per hour speed limit for one
direction of traffic and did nothing to regulate or warn traffic traveling in the opposite
direction. The trial court's reasoning would lead to this and many other illogical results.
Clearly, Draper owed Snell a duty to regulate the frontage road in a consistent
condition conducive to the safe flow of traffic because it undertook to regulate theflowof
traffic when it erected the 40 mile per hour speed limit sign for southbound traffic. Whether
or not Draper breached this duty should appropriately be considered by the trier of fact.
Accordingly, Snell respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's determination
and hold that Draper owed Snell a duty of reasonable care in its regulation of traffic flow on
thefrontageroad at Point of the Mountain, Draper, Utah.
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n.
Alternatively, this Court Should Abrogate the Public
Duty Doctrine or Should Hold that a Governmental Entity's
Duties related to Street Regulation, Construction and Maintenance
are Exceptions to the Public Duty Doctrine.
Should this Court determine that the public duty doctrine bars SnelTs claim against
Draper because a duty to all is a duty to none, this Court should abrogate the public duty
doctrine or, at a minimum, hold that Draper's duties related to street regulation, construction
and maintenance are exceptions to the public duty doctrine. There are several well-founded
reasons why the pubhc duty doctrine should not bar claims against governmental entities in
street and road cases.
First, and foremost, application of a judicially-created doctrine (whose origins are in
nonfeasance situations) is inappropriate where the legislature has affirmatively waived
immunity. The Utah Legislature has affirmatively and specifically provided that "immunity
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by the defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road [or] street" Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8
(emphasis added) (of course this waiver of immunity is qualified by the exception for
discretionary or policy acts; see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10). The legislature has further
explained that "[i]f immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person."
20

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(l)(b) (emphasis added). By this enactment, the legislature has
foreclosed treating and analyzing the liability of public entities any differently from private
persons. (It also produces uneven and unjust results by making an arbitrary distinction
between possible defendants.)

Hence, any rationale by the courts that the public duty

doctrine is justified by policy considerations specific to public entities is inappropriate and
meritless.
Indeed as was stated in Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted),
It is the power and responsibility of the Legislature to enact laws
to promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare
of society and this Court will not substitute our judgment for
that of the Legislature with respect to what best serves the public
interest.
Since the legislative power is vested in the Utah Legislature (see Utah Constitution Art. VI,
§ 1) and the legislature has spoken on the matter, any contradictory result by the courts raises
separation of powers concerns under Utah Constitution Art. V, § 1. State courts cannot,
under the pretense of an actual case, assume powers vested in the legislature or undermine
its pronouncements. Conrad v. City & County of Denver. 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982); People
in Interest of L.R.S.. 791 P.2d 1215 (Colo. App. 1990).
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Besides, to the extent that public duty doctrine is justified by concerns over whether
public entities will be exposed too broadly to liability and that this exposure will hamper the
effectiveness of public entities (see, e.g., Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151; Cannon, 866 P.2d at 589),
these concerns are still safeguarded by traditional tort notions of foreseeability, breach of
duty, actual cause and proximate cause, and damages. See generally. Rollins. 813 P.2d at
1164-68 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; arguing for the abrogation of
the public duty doctrine). Perhaps more importantly, the legislature has retained immunity
in many instances; and even where the legislature has waived immunity, that waiver is
subject to significant exceptions, such as immunity for discretionary or policy acts.
While it is true that a number of decisions have made the analytical distinction
between the affirmative defense of governmental immunity and whether a duty exists in the
first place, the practical effect of such discussions offers a distinction without a difference.
See, e.g.. Ferree. 784 P.2d at 151-53; Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 539-40. This approach is
intellectually disingenuous because, regardless of theoretical distinctions and methods of
analysis, the end result is always the same. If the court always analyzes whether a duty exists
under the public duty doctrine prior to considering whether the legislature has waived
immunity, the result will be to alwaysfindthere is no duty in the first place. Unfortunately,
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this approach renders the legislatures' waiver of sovereign immunity for dangerous road
conditions meaningless.
Finally, based upon the above-discussed reasons, there is a growing and significant
trend to abrogate the public duty doctrine; including a majority of Utah's neighboring
jurisdictions. Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1164-68 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part; arguing for the abrogation of the public duty doctrine and noting the modern trend
towards the same); see, e.g.. Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage. 741 P.2d 230 (Alaska
1987); Adams v. State. 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Rvanv. State. 656 P.2d 597,
598-99 (Ariz. 1982); Leake v. Cain. 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier
Corp. v. Indian River County. 371 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad. 282
N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Stewart v. Schmieder. 386 So.2d 1351 (La. 1980); Jean W. v.
Commonwealth. 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993); Doucette v. Town of Bristol. 635 A.2d 1387
(N.H. 1993); Senear v. Board of Bernalilo County Comm'rs. 687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984);
Brennen v. Citv of Eugene. 591 P.2d 719, 725 (Or. 1979); Catone v. Medberry. 555 A.2d 328
(R.I. 1989); Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier. 638 A.2d 561 (Ver. 1993); Coffey v.
Milwaukee. 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976).
As noted by McQuillin:
The public duty rule has been abrogated in a number of
jurisdictions. The states have rejected the public duty rule
23

because the rule is, in effect if not in theory, a continuation of
the abolished governmental immunity doctrine. The rule also
creates confusion in the law and produces uneven and
inequitable results in practice. Courts abrogating the rule reject
the contention that the public duty rule is the only principle
protecting municipalities from massive liabilities; these courts
maintain that ordinary tort rules, such as the rule requiring
foreseeability of harm, will adequately limit the scope of
municipal liability. These courts also remind us that abrogation
of the doctrine of municipal governmental immunity merely
removes the defense of immunity and does not create any new
liability for a municipality.
18 McQuillin § 53.04.25 (3d ed. 1993).

McQuillin has also reasoned that once a

municipaHty affirmatively acts (e.g. by erecting traffic control devices) that it has "assumed
that duty" and "a special duty or special relationship comes into existence." 18 McQuillin
§53.04.30 (3d ed. 1993).
Simply stated, the application of the public duty doctrine in dangerous road condition
cases makes no sense in light of legislative mandates. Accordingly, should this Court find
that the public duty doctrine is a bar to Snells' claims, this Court should abrogate the public
duty doctrine or at least find that dangerous road condition cases are exceptions to its
application. Therefore, Snell respectfully requests that this Court abrogate the public duty
doctrine in toto or at least as it applies to dangerous road condition cases.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in granting Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although
Draper may not have had an affirmative duty to erect any traffic regulatory signs or devices
on thefrontageroad initially, the law is clear that once Draper affirmatively acted by erecting
a 40-mile per hour speed limit for the regulation of southbound traffic, the duty was imposed
upon Draper to install such traffic regulatory devices in a non-negligent manner. Plaintiffs
allege that the failure by Draper to provide consistent traffic regulation for motor vehicle
traffic on the same two-lane road, at the same area, traveling in opposite directions
constituted negligence on the part of Draper City. The failure of Draper City to provide
consistent regulatoiy devices for both directions of traffic created a hazardous and defective
condition on thefrontageroad. This failure, plaintiffs allege, was a proximate cause of the
accident for which the plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court. The lower court's order
granting summary judgment for the defendant should be reversed and the matter remanded
for trial.

25

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / A day of Jfylot

, 1997.

, BAGGEY, CORNWALL
EARTHY
Key Bank Tower, Suite 1600
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Stephen F. Hutchinson
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE
& HUTCHINSON
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Attorneys for Appellants Judy Snell and
LeRoy Snell, Guardians and Conservators
of the Estate of Kenneth Reed Snell

26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that £- true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument
1997, to
were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ifj&y of JldJf£
the following:
Dennis C. Ferguson
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen F. Hutchinson
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE
& HUTCHINSON
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

SMU4&UJ**^
155896

27

APPENDIX
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

63-30-1
Section

63-30-35.

63-30-36.

Section
against governmental entity
or employee — Insurance coverage exception.
Expenses of attorney general,
general counsel for state judiciary, and general counsel for
the Legislature in representing the state, its branches,
members, or employees.
Defending government em-

63-30-37.

63-30-38.

ployee — Request — Cooperation — Payment of judgment.
Recovery of judgment paid and
defense costs by government
employee.
Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.

63-30-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental
Immunity Act."
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act," as used in this section, means Laws 1965,
ch. 139, SS 1 to 37. which enacted §§ 63-30-1
to 63-30-10, 63-30-11 to 63-30-28, and 63-30-31
to 63-30-33.
Cross-References. — Comparative negligence, §S 78-27-37, 78-27-38.

Insect infestation emergency control activities, immunity, § 4-35-8.
Limitation of actions on claims against cities, § 78-12-30.
Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions. $ 63-37-1 et seq.
Voluntary services for public entities, immunity from liability, SS 63-30b-l to 63-30b-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Adkins v. Division of State Lands. 719 P.2d
524 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Application of act.
Equitable claims.
Application of act.
Governmental Immunity Act applies only to
entities and does not include the entities' employees. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925
(Utah 1977).
This act applies only to governmental entities and does not affect the personal liability of
individuals for their own torts. Madsen v.
State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978).
Judicial review of a decision of the Division
of State Lands to cancel a lease was authorized
by former § 65-1-9 and did not require compliance with the Governmental Immunitv Act.

Equitable claims.
The Governmental Immunity Act did not
abolish the common-law exception of equitable
claims from governmental immunity: claims
for overcharges on water and sewer service and
for discrimination in failing to provide usual
city services were equitable in nature, and governmental immunity and lack of notice were
not available as defenses. El Rancho Enters.,
Inc., v. Murray Citv Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah
1977).
Governmental immunity is not a defense to
equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah
1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analvsis, 1967 Utah
L. Rev. 120.
Misapplication of Governmental Immunity
— Epting v. Utah, 1976 Utah L. Rev. 186.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. 495.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 244.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-

cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 129.
Journal of Energy, Natural Resources
and Environmental Law. — Government Liability for Seismic Hazards in Utah. 11 J. Energy. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 69 (1990).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties and Other Political
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.; 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 1 et
seq.: 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools $8 5. 17;*72 Am.
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Jur. 2d States. Territories, and Dependencies
^ 99 to 128.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties ^§ 180 et seq.,
239 et seq.; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
* 745 et seq.: 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
^ 2173 to 2214; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School
Districts $» 100. 153, 238, 318 to 322; 79 C.J.S.
Schools and School Districts &S 423 to 444;
81A C.J.S. Stat*. « 196 to 202. 267 et seq.
A.L.R. - R.gh of contractor with federal,
state, or local public body to latter s immunity
M An ^ i l i t y . 9 AL.R.3d 382.
rf
Modern status of doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to public schools and institutions of higher learning, 33 A.L.R.3d 703.
Immunitv of private schools and institutions
of higher learning from iiabiiitv in tort, 38
A.L.R.3d 480.
Sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding
suit against sister state for tort committed
within forum state, 81 A.L.R.3d 1239.
Official immunity of state national guard
members. 52 A.L.R.4th 1095.
Liability to one struck bv golf ball, 53
A.L.R.4th 282.
"
Liability of school authorities for hiring or

63-30-2.

63-30-2

retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable
teacher. 60 A.L.R.4th 260.
Tort liability of United States under Claims
Act for acts committed by aliens, 78 A.L.R.
p e( j. 683.
Calculations of attorneys' fees under Federal
T o r t C l a i m s A c t _ 2 8 y^g
§ 2 678, 86 A.L.R.
F e < i ggg
Construction and application of Federal Tort
c l a i m s A c t p r o v i s i o n excepting from coverage
^
interference with contract
a
h t g ( 2 g J^g
s 2680(h
g2 A L R
?ed
1 £„
^ n . ^
, •
A* i- .
,. Application of collateral source rule m act 0 n
* o jL under FeAdeTrai T ° r t J C l a i i n 8 A c t ( 2 8 U S C S
* 2674) > 1 0 4 A L R - F e d - 4 9 2 Appealability, under collateral order doctrine of o r d e r
denying qualified immunity in
42 USCS § 1983 or Bivens action for damages
where claim for equitable relief is also pending
— post-Harlow cases, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 851.
Key Numbers. — Counties *=» 141 to 148,
197 to 228; Municipal Corporations «=» 723 et
seq., 1001 to 1040: Schools *» 89 et seq., 112 et
seq.; States «=» 112, 169 et seq., 191.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section
62A-4-603, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
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63-30-4

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defining Governmental Function Under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 J. Contemp. L.
193 (1983).
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. —
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert:
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987).
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for personal injury or death under mob violence or
anti-lynching statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142.
Liability of municipality for property damage under mob violence statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d
1198.
Modern status of rule excusing governmental unit from tort liability on theory that only
general, not particular, duty was owed under
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194.
Governmental tort liability for failure to provide police protection to specifically threatened
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287.
Governmental liability for failure to post
highway deer crossing warning signs, 59
A.L.R.4th 1217.

State's liability for personal injuries from
criminal attack in state park, 59 A.L.R.4th
1236.
Tort liability of public authority for failure
to remove parentally abused or neglected children from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942.
Tort liability of college or university for injury suffered by student as a result of own or
fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 8L
Hospital's liability for injury allegedly
caused by failure to have properly qualified
staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63
A.L.R.4th 221.
Tort liability of college, university, fraternity, or sorority for injury or death of member
or prospective member by hazing or initiation
activity, 68 A.L.R.4th 228.
Governmental liability for negligence in licensing, regulating, or supervising private
day-care home in which child is injured, 68
A.L.R.4th 266.
Right of one governmental subdivision to sue
another such subdivision for damages, 11
A.L.R.5th 630.
Construction and application of Federal Tort
Claims Act provision excepting from coverage
claims arising out of assault and battery (28
USCS § 2680(h)), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 7.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may
be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or
for governmental entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued
is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity
were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action under this chapter
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an
act or omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a
plaintiffs exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the
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63-30-9

63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899
R2d 1231 (Utah 1995).

ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Implied covenants.
Cited.
Applicability.
This section does not waive the notice requirements for a suit against a state employee
for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of his duties, notwithstanding a
nexus between the claim asserted and uany
contractual obligation." Nielson v. Gurley, 888

Implied covenants.
By its waiver of immunity "as to any contractual obligation," the state is liable for its
breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implicit in its contracts. Brown v. Weis,
871 P.2d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Broadbent v. Board of Educ, 283
Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other structures.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
maintenance of a traffic device, but involved a
policy-based plan and the exercise of judgment
and discretion; thus, the decision was a discretionary act shielded from liability. Keegan v.
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995).

ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Discretionary function.
Governmental control.
School bus route.
Applicability.
The 1991 amendment, providing that the
waiver provisions of this section are subject to
the discretionary function exception of § 60-3010, does not apply retroactively. Keegan v.
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995).

Governmental control.
A governmental entity is affected by the
waiver of immunity under this section only if it
has control over the roads or highways upon
which the dangerous condition exists. De
Villiers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

Discretionary function.
The Department of Transportation's decision
not to raise a concrete barrier during highway
surface overlay projects was not an operational
decision involving the negligent installation or

School bus route.
Legislature did not intend to include the
function of designing school bus routes within
waiver of this section. Smith v. Weber County
Sen. Dist, 877 P.2d 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Public park.
Applicability.
Before the 1991 amendments to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, the discretionary
function and assault and battery exceptions in
§ 63-30-10 did not apply to the waiver of im-

munity in this section for defective or dangerous conditions in government buildings. The
amendments were not retroactive. Taylor ex
rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 881 P.2d
907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), reVd on other
grounds, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995).
Public park.
Since the Governmental Immunity Act spe-
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cifically addresses public improvements, it is
the law most specific to a public park. De
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Baritault ex rel. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1996).

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil
rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence,
and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in amy state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust
Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog;
(13) the management offloodwaters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or
other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement;
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or
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(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, Chapter 10
which immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989,
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch.
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299,
§ 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment,, effective May 1, 1995, substituted
"School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of Sovereign Lands
and Forestry" for "Board of State Lands and
Forestry" in Subsection (11).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective
July 1, 1996, added "in connection with, or

results from" to the end of the introductory
paragraph; deleted "or results from" from the
beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in connection with" from the beginning of Subsection
(8); and substituted "Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (11).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 264, effective
July 1, 1996, added Subsection (19), making a
related stylistic change.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Approval of plat.
Assault and battery.
Discretionary function.
Sovereign immunity.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the test developed in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (1980); thus, the immunity act is not
unconstitutional as applied to a person who
was injured when assaulted and struck by an
employee of the University. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 R2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Applicability.
Before the 1991 amendments to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, the discretionary
function and assault and battery exceptions in
this section did not apply to the waiver of
immunity for defective or dangerous conditions
in government buildings in § 63-30-9. The
amendments were not retroactive. Taylor ex
rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 881 P.2d
907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), reVd on other
grounds, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995).
The 1991 amendment of § 60-30-8, providing
that the waiver provisions thereof are subject
to the discretionary function exception of this
section, does not apply retroactively. Keegan v.
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995).
Approval of plat.
A city's approval of a subdivision plat was
clearly excepted by this section from any
waiver of immunity, and plaintiffs claim characterizing the city's conduct as designing an
intersection was effectively barred. De Villiers

v. Utah County, 882 P2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
Assault and battery.
The State, a school district, the State School
for the Deaf and Blind, and the State Board of
Education were exempt under Subsection (6)
for injuries resulting to plaintiff, a deaf child,
who was sexually molested and assaulted by a
cab driver in taxi hired by the defendants to
transport handicapped children to school. S.H.
ex rel. R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993).
Notwithstanding allegations that negligent
implementation of a prerelease program led to
plaintiffs injuries by assault and battery at the
hands of a prerelease inmate, state defendants
were immune from suit under the assault and
battery exception in Subsection (2). Malcolm v.
State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994).
Plaintiff's complaint based on injuries received when she was assaulted and struck by
an employee of the University of Utah and
asserting that the injuries arose from the University's negligent hiring and supervision of the
employee rather than from a battery was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. This
section focuses on the conduct or situation out
of which the injury arose, not on the theory of
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of
negligence alleged. Wright v. University of
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 R2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
An amendment to a complaint based on injuries received when plaintiff was assaulted and
struck by an employee of the University of Utah
alleging t h a t because of his questionable mental condition, the employee lacked the requisite
intent for assault and battery, thus making
Subsection (2) of this section inapplicable,
would be a fruitless attempt to circumvent the
clear language of the section. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 883 P2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

63-30-11
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Subsection (2) does not require that the person committing an assault and battery must be
engaged in a governmental function in order for
a government entity to qualify for immunity
under this section. The immunity act specifies
only that a court examine generally whether
the activity that the governmental entity performs is a governmental function under § 6330-30. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 R2d
380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359
(Utah 1994).
Discretionary function.
The Department of Transportation's decision
not to raise a concrete barrier during highway
surface overlay projects was not an operational
decision involving the negligent installation or
maintenance of a traffic device, but involved a
policy-based plan and the exercise of judgment
and discretion; thus, the decision was a discretionary act shielded from liability. Keegan v.
State, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 1995).
Sovereign immunity.
Acts that are core governmental functions or
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are unique to government are outside the protection of Utah Const., Art I., Sec. 11; thus, in
an action against a county building official and
the county for injuries based on negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance
of a building permit, the defendants' acts were
core governmental functions within the scope of
the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3) and (4). DeBry v. Noble, 257 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995).
Subsections (3) and (4) of § 63-30-4 contemplate that a government employee can be sued
for fraud even if the employee acted in a representative capacity; thus, even though the governmental agency may be immune from liability under this section, an employee who
commits fraud in the course of his employment
can be held personally liable. DeBry v. Noble,
257 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995).
Cited in Day v. State, ex rel. Utah Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 882 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Municipal liability for negligent
performance of building inspector's duties, 24
A.L.R.5th 200.

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Defendant's capacity.
Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
Cited.
Defendant's capacity.
Because it was clear that defendant engaged
in the conduct complained of while performing
his duties as a state employee and the plaintiff
was aware that the defendant claimed to have
acted under color of authority, the plaintiff
could not complain on appeal that the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply because he
meant to sue defendant as an ordinary individual, not for anything he did in the course of
his employment by the state. Nielson v. Gurley,
888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied,
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
Notice.
Plaintiff's filing of a notice of claim with the
governmental agency alleged to be responsible
for his injuries, but not with the attorney general, did not satisfy the notice requirements of
this section and § 63-3-12, even though the
agency forwarded the notice to the attorney

general. Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
This section does not waive the notice requirements for a suit against a state employee
for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of his duties, notwithstanding a
nexus between the claim asserted and "any
contractual obligation." Nielson v. Gurley, 888
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
Sufficiency of notice.
Notice was deficient that came more than one
year after the claim arose; this deficiency was
fatal to the trial court's jurisdiction. Nielson v.
Gurley, 888 R2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert,
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
In personal injury action against county,
plaintiff fulfilled purpose of notice requirement
by filing notice of her claim with the person in
the county attorney's office designated by the
county commission as the appropriate person to
whom such notice should be sent. Bischel v.
Merritt, 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Cited in Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 284
Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUDY SNELL and LEROY SNELL,
Guardians and Conservators of
the Estate of Kenneth Read
Snell,

ORDER GRANTING
CITY OF DRAPER'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v,
SALT LAKE COUNTY; UTAH COUNTY;
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; CITY OF DRAPER,
UTAH; and CITY OF LEHI, UTAH,

Civil No. 950906363 PI
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.
The Motion for Summary Judgment of City of Draper ("Draper")
came on regularly for hearing on June 24, 1996. Plaintiffs were
represented by their counsel John L. Young of Richards, Brandt,
Miller & Nelson; Draper was represented by its counsel Dennis C.
Ferguson of Williams & Hunt; appearing for defendant Utah County
was David C. Richards of Christensen & Jensen.

The issues

presented by Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment were fully
briefed and the Court, having reviewed the respective memoranda
of the parties prior to the hearing, heard and considered the

argument of counsel and, being fully advised, finds that there is
no dispute regarding the facts that are material to the case that
would preclude ruling on Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The facts that are undisputed and that are material to the
Court's determination of the duty issue, include the following:
1.

Plaintiffs are the guardians and conservators of the

estate of Kenneth Read Snell, who was seriously injured in an
automobile collision in Draper, Utah on October 13, 1993.
2.

The collision occurred on the east frontage road that

parallels Interstate 15, where it intersects with a private road
leading to a sand and gravel facility.
3.

Mr. Snell was returning from the Lehi Animal Shelter,

where he had picked up a load of animals to return to the
University of Utah, who was his employer at the time.
4.

Mr. Snell was traveling northbound on the frontage road

and the University of Utah van he was driving collided with a
large truck used to haul sand and gravel owned by Cazier
Excavation.

Darrell Casey, the driver of the Cazier truck, was

turning left onto the private dirt road which was owned and
maintained by Geneva Rock.
5.

Draper City was responsible for the maintenance of the

frontage road in question but not of the private road which
intersected with it.
6.

The place of the accident was approximately one mile

north of the south Draper City boundary.
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7.

Prior to the accident, Draper had posted a 40 mile per

hour speed limit sign on the west side of the frontage road which
was visible to southbound traffic.

Draper City had not placed on

the east side of the frontage road any speed limit signs, or
other signs warning of the intersection, along the one mile
stretch from its southern-most border to the gravel facility
road.
Based upon these undisputed facts, plaintiffs claim that
Draper owed a duty to Kenneth Snell to have placed a speed limit
sign on the east side of the frontage road.

Plaintiffs claim

that the failure to place such a speed limit sign was negligence
and that the negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Draper seeks summary judgment on three theories:

(1) it

does not owe a duty to erect the speed limit sign or other
warning signs, but a duty only to maintain those it has erected;
(2) any duty that is owed is a duty owed to the public at large
and plaintiffs' claims are barred by the public duty doctrine;
and (3) immunity from suit has not been waived under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-8, which waives immunity for injury caused by a
defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any highway, because
Draper did not control the gravel road which is alleged to have
created the dangerous condition.

Plaintiffs acknowledge the

general rule that a governmental entity has no duty to erect
warning signs, even though it has a duty to maintain roads in a
condition reasonably safe for travel.
- 3 -

Jones

v. Bountiful

City,

834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1993); De Villiers
P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994).

v.

Utah County,
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Plaintiffs argue, however, that once

Draper placed a speed limit sign controlling the southbound
traffic that it had a duty to place a similar sign, in an
appropriate position controlling northbound traffic.
Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the Court to
determine.

Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 198 9) ; LaMarr

Utah Department

of Transportation,

v.

828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992).

Based upon the undisputed material facts and the precedent
established by current case law, the Court finds that there is no
duty on the part of Draper to have erected a speed limit sign on
the east side of the frontage road.
Utah County, supra., and Jones

As stated in De Villiers

v. Bountiful

City,

v.

supra.,

Draper's duty is to maintain those signs which it has placed.
The Court is not persuaded that by having placed one sign on the
west side of the frontage road restricting speed of southbound
traffic to 40 miles per hour that Draper then has the duty to
place other speed limit signs elsewhere.
With respect to the defense that the plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the "public duty doctrine", Draper asserts that the
holding of Cannon v.
is dispositive.

University

of Utah,

866 P. 2d 586 .(Utah 1993)

Under the "public duty doctrine", a duty to all

is a duty to none.

The Court finds that for Draper to be liable

for a negligently-caused injury suffered by the plaintiffs, the
plaintiffs must show a breach of duty owed to Kenneth Snell as an
- 4 -

individual, not merely a breach of an obligation owed to the
general public at large.

The Court finds that Draper, having

posted 40 mile per hour speed limits for southbound traffic on
the frontage road, did so for the public at large and had no duty
to Kenneth Snell to post similar traffic regulations for his
benefit northbound on the same frontage road.

|

Because the Court finds in favor of Draper on the duty
issue, it does not reach the governmental immunity issue also
raised in Draper's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Therefore, based

upon the undisputed facts and the legal conclusions recited
herein, the Court hereby
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the Motion for Summary Judgment of
Draper City be and the same is hereby GRANTED and plaintiffs'
case against Draper is dismissed as a matter of law and with
prejudice.

Each of the parties is to bear his, her or its

respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein.
DATED this OU>

day of July, 1996.

